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Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and
Turner to Matsushita
Wesley J. Liebeler *
Legal activity on the predatory pricing front has been frenetic
since 1975. The subject has been featured in some twenty-five
journal articles1 and in approximately fifty-five cases in the federal
courts. 2 In the thirty years preceding 1975 there appears to have
been only one significant predatory pricing case.3 Nor was preda-
tory pricing a popular subject in the legal journals during that
period.4
This sharp increase in legal activity since 1975 might lead one
to conclude that American businessmen have been on a predatory
pricing binge. They have not. Judge Kaufman wrote in 1981 that
"nowhere in the outpouring of literature on the subject do com-
mentators suggest that [predatory] pricing is either common or
likely to increase."5 In 1986 the Supreme Court reported that
"there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." 6 An ex-
amination of the predatory pricing cases decided since 1975 con-
firms these views.7 Most of those cases are insubstantial. Almost all
could have been decided for the defendant on summary motions;
many of them were. Not one of the cases is a real predatory pricing
case.
8
An important period in the history of concern with predatory
pricing falls between the 1975 Areeda-Turner article9 and the 1986
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. Ms. Andrea Mays pro-
vided research assistance. My work has been supported by a grant from the John M. Olin
Foundation made through the UCLA Graduate School of Management. I thank them both.
1 See Appendix C to this article.
2 See Appendix A to this article.
3 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). Utah Pie was not a
monopolization case. It was brought under the Robinson-Patman Act and the only real
issue was whether the plaintiff had shown the requisite injury to competition.
4 John McGee did, however, write his important article in 1958. McGee, Predatory Pric-
ing: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958) See also Koller, The MI'yth of
Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1971).
5 Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT & T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982).
6 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357-58 (1986).
7 See Appendix A.
8 There are only two or three cases where reasonable persons might disagree with this
judgment. See text accompanying notes 58-73 infra.
9 Areeda & Turner, Predatoy Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Shermnan
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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Supreme Court decision in Matsushita.10 Professors Areeda and
Turner argued that prices were predatory only if they were below
short-run marginal cost or its surrogate, short-run average variable
cost. Their work prompted a flood of articles offering criticism and
advice on how to recognize and deal with predatory pricing."
Along with this academic flood came a torrent of cases.' 2 Ironi-
cally, the Areeda-Turner article contributed to a vast increase in the
number of predatory pricing cases, even though its authors seem to
have intended to make it more difficult to win such cases.' 3 It also
led the courts to focus particularly on the relationship between the
alleged predator's prices and costs.
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court reminded us that predatory
pricing is quite implausible. The Third Circuit had reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants which
were principally a group of Japanese television manufacturers
charged with conspiring for some twenty years to charge predato-
rily low prices in the United States. The Supreme Court in turn
reversed the Third Circuit, emphasizing that "conduct as consistent
with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy [or preda-
tion] does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust
conspiracy [or predation]."'4 The fact that "predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful"' I signifi-
cantly increases the plaintiff's burden in resisting a motion for sum-
mary judgment by the defendant. Whenever predatory intent must
be shown inferentially, as is almost always the case, the competing
hypothesis of vigorous competition will ordinarily overcome an in-
ference of predatory behavior. In discussing the improbability of
predation, the Court focused on the problems of obtaining a mo-
10 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
11 See Appendix C.
12 By late April 1986 the Areeda-Turner article had been cited in fifty-nine decisions of
the federal courts and a number of important Federal Trade Commission decisions. See
Appendix A. To that date from 1975, 120 decisions in the courts of appeal contained the
words "predatory pricing," although that term had appeared in only seventeen such deci-
sions during the preceding thirty years. These are the results of running the queries
"Areeda/predatory/pricing" and "predatory/pricing" in Westlaw's "AllFeds" library on
April 20, 1986. That library extends back to 1945. Not all, if even a majority, of these
decisions actually involved predatory pricing issues under the Sherman Act. This article
refers to decisions while Appendix A sets forth only different cases. Many times one case will
produce more than one decision.
13 Their average variable or marginal cost standard would be harder to overcome than
the more traditional test for predatory pricing under which an inference of predation was
supported by prices below average total cost. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
385 U.S. 685 (1967). While there is usually no explicit discussion of the type of cost that
supports an inference of predation in the older cases, it appears that the courts were think-
ing of average total cost.
14 106 S. Ct. at 1357.
15 Id. at 1357-58.
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nopoly without incurring unrecoupable losses and the problem of
preventing entry during the recoupment period. Unlike the
Areeda-Turner article, the Court emphasized factors other than the
relationship between the alleged predator's prices and costs.
I make three main points in this article. My first point is that
post-1975 academic literature has led many courts to become ex-
cessively preoccupied with the relationship between price and cost.
This in turn has led them to slight or ignore other factors on which
a legitimate inference of predatory pricing depends. Absent such
factors, no inference of predation can be drawn even if prices are
significantly below the lowest appropriate measure of cost. These
other factors include rigorously defined markets, a dangerous
probability of success in monopolizing, and the ability to maintain
higher prices long enough to recoup the predatory losses.
My second point is that almost all of the predatory pricing
cases that have come before the courts since 1975 could have been
decided summarily for the defendant under the standards set forth
in Matsushita. More particularly, this usually could have been done
without considering the relationship between the alleged predator's
price and cost. The conclusion to be drawn from these two points
is that courts should focus more on factors other than the
price/cost relationship. Moreover, they should rely on these other
factors more heavily to decide more cases summarily for
defendants.
This approach could quickly reduce the social cost of the pres-
ent approach to predatory pricing, which relies heavily on juries op-
erating under vague and ill-defined rules of law. The value of the
time of attorneys, experts, courts, and businessmen is one social
cost of such an approach; this cost alone almost certainly exceeds
the social costs of monopoly power that has been obtained via
predatory pricing. The more important cost of the present ap-
proach, however, is that firms will tend to avoid price cuts that
might prompt litigation by competitors. The existing approach al-
most certainly restricts competition by inhibiting such price cuts. 16
Other medicine is available if needed to curb this nonproduc-
tive predatory pricing litigation. I develop this, my third point, in
Part II. I argue there that competitors, even of a true predator, if
there is such, are not injured by an antitrust violation unless the
predatory prices actually fall below the predator's marginal cost.
This is so for two reasons. First, predatory pricing does not cause
any direct antitrust injury (create a market inefficiency) as long as
16 The Supreme Court in Alatsushita emphasized that "courts should not permit
factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of
such practices is often to deter pro-competitive conduct." 106 S. Ct. at 1360.
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such prices remain at or above the predator's marginal cost. Sec-
ond, if such predatory pricing causes any indirect antitrust injury, it
must be the injury associated with the monopoly overcharges made
by the predator after it becomes a monopolist. But there is no
causal connection between that antitrust injury and the predator's
competitors. Only the monopolist's customers suffer injury from
that antitrust violation. It follows that treble damages for predatory
prices, at least as long as those prices are above the predator's mar-
ginal cost, should be limited to recovery by consumers for the mo-
nopoly overcharges which the successful predator, now a
monopolist, will be desperate to make to recoup its predatory
losses.
I. Predatory Pricing in the Courts Since 1975
A. Introduction
The 1975 Areeda-Turner article and the flood of academic
literature that followed has been associated with a sharp increase in
the number of predatory pricing cases. There do not appear to have
been any predatory pricing cases brought under section 2 of the
Sherman Act in the thirty years preceding 1975. Approximately
fifty-five such cases were decided in the federal courts from 1975 to
date. The academic controversy over predatory pricing surely
caused part of this increase, if only by bringing the possibilities to
the attention of the antitrust bar.
The post-1975 flood of academic literature proposing various
economic tests for predation, however, did little to help courts de-
cide the increasing number of predatory pricing cases with which
they were confronted. This was true in spite (or perhaps because)
of the fact that the courts responded to the economic approach ad-
vanced by most of that literature with an alacrity not commonly ob-
served in the history of the relationship between academics and
judges. Indeed, many courts became preoccupied with a cost-based
test for predatory pricing. This preoccupation has caused them
more problems than it has solved. They have spent much time con-
sidering the nature and importance of different economic costs,
while few if any of the cases decided since 1975 need have turned
on such distinctions.1 7
Although the point has been submerged in the controversy
over which costs provide the appropriate standard for predatory
pricing, it must be remembered that pricing below cost does not by
itself constitute a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. While
17 See text accompanying notes 58-73 infra and Appendix A.
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formulations may differ somewhat, in order to show an attempt to
monopolize, for example, a plaintiff must establish:
1. Specific intent to control prices or destroy competition in a
relevant market.
2. Predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accom-
plishing the unlawful purpose.
3. A dangerous probability of success.
4. Antitrust injury.18
The second of the above elements, predatory or anticompeti-
tive conduct, is common to all claims under section 2.19 A plaintiff
can ordinarily establish that element by showing that the defendant
has engaged in predatory pricing. To do that, however, the plaintiff
must not only prove that the defendant's prices were below some
relevant cost but also that the defendant had a "reasonable expec-
tation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more
than the losses suffered" during the period of predation.20 To con-
vince a trier of fact that predation is a plausible inference to draw
from below-cost pricing, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
has both a dangerous probability of successfully monopolizing and
also a similar probability of recouping his predatory losses. Lack-
ing direct evidence of predatory intent, the plaintiff must present
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendant
was simply engaged in vigorous competition. 21 The Supreme
Court believes, as Matsushita indicates, that with predatory pricing,
"if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-[plain-
tiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support
their claim than would otherwise be necessary." 22
Since the plaintiff must prove all four of the above factors to
establish predatory pricing, it would be wise for a court to scan all
those factors before addressing any one of them in detail. It makes
no sense for a court to consider at length which costs define preda-
tory prices, or whether the defendant's prices were in fact below
such costs, if it appears that the defendant lacks a dangerous
probability of achieving a monopoly and maintaining it long enough
to recoup its predatory losses. Nor does it make sense for a court
to probe the remaining factors if the defendant's prices were not
below the relevant cost.
If one factor in the plaintiff's case is clearly weaker than the
18 See, e.g., Williams Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014 (9th Cir. 1981); California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979).
19 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1356.
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others, the court should analyze it before considering the others.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken a similar approach
in attempted monopolization cases. It believes that "the dangerous
probability of success element should be evaluated 'before pro-
ceeding to the other two elements.' "23
No rule is needed, however, on which element to examine first.
After a cursory examination of all the elements of the offense, the
court should focus on the one which is easiest to resolve. It should
hardly be necessary to state this obvious point. The necessity be-
comes clear, however, after reading the post-1975 predatory pric-
ing cases. Some courts seem to go out of their way to focus on the
price/cost issue, engaging in lengthy and often erroneous discus-
sions of subjects best left to advanced economics seminars, when
the cases before them could easily be resolved by analyzing one of
the other elements of the relevant offense.2 4 This point is well illus-
trated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Inglis case.25
B. Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co.
Inglis was one of four wholesale bakers in the northern Califor-
nia-Nevada area.26 It claimed that Continental and the other two
independents had attempted to monopolize the white bread market
in that area by charging discriminatory and below-cost prices over a
period of approximately ten years beginning in 1967.27 Inglis ex-
pired in 1976. Campbell-Taggart, the largest of the independents,
settled. The jury found in favor of the third largest independent
(American) but returned a verdict against Continental for over five
million dollars. The district judge granted Continental's motion
for judgment n.o.v. on the Sherman Act claims, holding that before
it could prevail Inglis had to prove that Continental's prices were
below marginal cost. The court of appeals reversed after an exten-
sive discussion of the price/cost issue and remanded the case for
another trial.28
To analyze the Inglis case, it is necessary first to set forth some
important facts about the white bread market in general and in the
23 See ITT Continental Baking Co., 104 F.T.C. 280, 407 (1984); General Foods Corp.,
103 F.T.C. 204 (1984); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 725-26 (1980).
24 See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014
(9th Cir. 1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
25 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1981).
26 The other three independent bakers were Campbell-Taggart, American Bakeries,
and ITT Continental. Retail chains such as Safeway and Lucky Stores also operated
bakeries.
27 668 F.2d at 1024.
28 Id.
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northern California-Nevada area in particular. These facts do not
appear in the Inglis court's decision; they come from the FTC's
opinion dismissing its predatory pricing case against Continental. 29
That opinion shows that in 1972 the relevant market shares were:
Campbell-Taggart with 34%; Continental with 25.5%; American
with 21.3%; Safeway & Lucky with 15%; and Inglis with 4.3%.3o
The FTC also noted that most wholesale bakeries had been operat-
ing at a loss since 1973 and that many smaller bakeries were going
out of business.3 t The Commission also found that:
The wholesale bakers' problems have been caused, in large
part, by the activities and growth of chain bakeries, costly labor
contracts, technological improvements that have created over-
capacity, improved highways permitting larger areas to be
served by a single plant, high ingredient, selling and distribu-
tion costs, problems arising from Federal price controls in effect
since Aug. 1971, and the decline in per capita consumption of
bread. Of particular current impact is the tremendous increase
in the cost of flour following the shipment of flour to Russia in
1972 and the corresponding short supply here coupled with the
inability to recoup costs because of price controls. These fac-
tors are generally found, to varying extents, in all markets,
whether or not ITT Continental is present.32
That these conditions were also present in the Inglis market ap-
pears most clearly from the excess capacity that was present there.
The court of appeals noted that "during an eleven-week strike in
December 1972 andJanuary 1973, which dosed the bakeries oper-
ated by Continental and Campbell-Taggart, American and Inglis
were able to supply the entire demand with their existing capac-
ity." 3 3 The particular importance of these facts is shown by the
market share figures set forth above. American and Inglis together
had about the same market share as Continental, while Campbell-
Taggart was significantly larger than Continental. Either Campbell-
Taggart or Continental had sufficient capacity by itself to supply the
relevant market. American and Inglis apparently tripled their out-
put to satisfy the demand left unfilled when the strike closed Camp-
bell-Taggart and Continental. Presumably each firm could
similarly increase its output in response to Continental's supposed
attempt to monopolize this market.
This excess capacity requires an adjustment of the market
share figures set forth above. Those figures show the relative out-
put of each firm in the market. They do not compare the output of
29 See ITT Continental Baking Co., 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984).
30 Id. at 413.
31 Id. at 398-99 (1984).
32 Id.
33 668 F.2d at 1025.
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any firm to the total capacity present in the market. The latter com-
parison is more relevant than the former in attempting to assess a
firm's market power or its potential to obtain such power. Profes-
sor Hovenkamp makes this point in discussing Inglis:
It is now recognized that the best way to estimate a firm's
market power on the basis of market share is to weigh the firm's
current output against the total capacity of other firms in the
industry, not against the competitors' current output. Any par-
ticular firm's ability to raise its prices is limited not only by the
current output of its competitors, but also by their ability to pro-
duce more in response to a price increase. It is apparent that if
the excess capacity of competing firms is included, Continental's
real share of the northern California bread market was not
twenty percent, but more like eight percent.3 4
The FTC specifically found it "highly unlikely that Continental
could have acquired monopoly power in any of the relevant mar-
kets."3 5 It also found that "barriers to entry into the bread baking
industry [were] not particularly high."3 6
A cursory examination of these facts makes it clear that Inglis
could have been decided without reference to the price/cost issue.
All three of the necessary conditions of predation (those other than
a price below cost) were clearly absent. First, the market was not
realistically defined. The most striking thing about the Inglis opin-
ion is that the court did not discuss the market definition problems
at all.3 7 It is clear, however, that it makes no sense to exclude bread
made by bakeries that happen to be owned by retail grocery chains
from the relevant market.
Second, Continental had no chance of monopolizing the mar-
ket, however defined. It was the second largest firm in the market
with a 25.5% share, almost ten percentage points behind the lead-
ing firm. This share drops to about 8% when we take account of
excess capacity. The third largest independent (American) was
about the same size as Continental. A properly defined market
would also include other capable competitors in the form of
Safeway and Lucky stores. Inglis was by far the smallest firm in an
industry characterized by virulent overcapacity. These facts in
themselves render utterly unbelievable any claim of predatory pric-
34 Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIZ. ST.
LJ. 443. This approach is followed by the U.S. Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines.
Antitrust Division 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,828 (1984). See also
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 949 (1981).
35 104 F.T.C. at 412.
36 Id. at 415.
37 In addition, the court of appeals apparently intended to exclude from the relevant
market the integrated bakeries owned by Safeway and Lucky, even though it admitted that
the bread produced by those bakeries reduced the demand for bread from the independ-
ents. 668 F.2d at 1025-26.
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ing on Continental's part. After Matsushita,38 if not before, these
facts alone would require summary judgment for the defendant.
Third, even if Continental somehow obtained monopoly power
in this market, it would never be able to raise prices high enough
for a sufficient period to recoup its losses. To play out the preda-
tion story, it had taken almost ten years and significant losses just to
get rid of Inglis. How many more years and what losses would it
take to get rid of American and Campbell-Taggart, let alone
Safeway and Lucky? And, after all that, Continental would have suc-
ceeded in monopolizing an industry into which, according to the
FTC, the barriers to entry were "not particularly high." 39
The Inglis court got matters precisely backwards. It did not fo-
cus on the elements that were easy to decide: probability of suc-
cessfully monopolizing a realistically defined market and
Continental's ability to recoup losses that had already extended
over a ten-year period with more to come before a monopoly came
within its grasp. Instead the court decided the case-wrongly-en-
tirely on the price/cost issue. It appears to have been snared by the
delusion that the relationship between price and cost provides the
easiest way to decide predatory pricing cases.40
It is, of course, true that some predatory pricing cases can be
decided most easily by focusing on the price/cost issue. This is par-
ticularly true when the alleged predator's prices never fall below its
long-run marginal costs. The relationship between a firm's prices
and its costs, however, is often much more difficult to determine
than it would first appear. Costs are difficult to define in the ab-
stract and difficult to determine after they have been defined. In
remanding for a new trial, the court held that "the determination of
fixed and variable costs is a matter for the jury under appropriate
instructions." 4 1 These instructions would be difficult to formulate.
Once formulated, it would be hard for many first-class accountants
to provide the relevant figures. 42
In other cases the legal price/cost standard may be in doubt,43
the relationship between the alleged predator's price and cost may
be unclear, or such predator's prices may have dropped below the
38 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
39 104 F.T.C. at 415.
40 It may also have fallen into the peculiar syndrome in which lawyers and judges want
to play at being economists and vice versa.
41 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1038.
42 A person really must try to define correctly in a particular case the various relevant
costs in order to discover how complicated the problem is. Then, after the definition has
been forged, try to get the facts. It has to be seen to be believed.
43 Very few if any courts have adopted the marginal/average variable cost test without
reservation. Much time can be spent to show that the predator's prices are above (or be-
low) those costs only to have the case decided on other grounds.
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relevant cost standard. It will usually be much easier to decide such
cases on the basis of market definition, probability of successful
monopolization, or probability of recouping predatory losses.
Courts will be more effective, in short, if they review the facts
of all necessary conditions for a legitimate inference of predatory
pricing and then focus on those that are the easiest to resolve. The
Inglis court could easily have decided the case before it if it had
followed that procedure. If the court had done so it would have
realized the additional bonus of deciding the case correctly, which it
did not do after being led astray by the mirage of ertainty which
seems to surround the price/cost approach to predatory pricing.
The same has been true of many other predatory pricing cases de-
cided in the federal courts since 1975.
C. Events in the Courts
I have set forth in Appendix A brief descriptions of fifty-five
cases decided between 1975 and April 1986. These cases all in-
volve predatory pricing antitrust issues in one way or another.44
Most cases are based on section 2 of the Sherman Act, although the
Robinson-Patman Act 45 is also implicated in a fair number of them.
I have analyzed the cases in terms of the classic predatory pric-
ing paradigm. In that story the defendant first cuts prices to de-
stroy his competitors. It then raises prices to monopoly levels to
recoup its losses and more, at the same time preventing entry or
retarding it long enough to make the entire process profitable. The
first question raised by this paradigm is how far prices must be cut
before they can be predatory if the other necessary conditions of
predation are present. Prices have traditionally not been regarded
as predatory unless they fell below the suspected predator's aver-
age total cost.46
Prices remained above the predator's average total cost in thir-
teen of the fifty-five cases discussed in Appendix A.4 7 Under tradi-
tional standards, defendants' activities in these cases could not have
been held predatory even if all the other conditions of predation
had been present.48
44 I excluded most cases involving only a motion to dismiss, unless they included some
unique legal point. I also excluded cases reviewing decisions of regulatory agencies, as well
as international trade cases.
45 15 U.S.C. 13 (1982).
46 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). The average total
cost approach is tied to the view that predation is a function of intent as it historically has
been. It is hard to conclude that prices that turn a current profit can raise a presumption of
evil intent.
47 See Appendix B.
48 Price level was the only or most important factor in eliminating seven cases from
candidacy for truly predatory pricing status. The most important cases in which an infer-
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The second question raised by the paradigm is what market the
alleged predator is monopolizing or attempting to monopolize. If
we are serious in our enterprise of locating truly predatory pricing,
this market must be real. It cannot be one of the gerrymandered
beasts so commonly found in antitrust. It will not do, for example,
to monopolize a "market" for band uniforms as distinct from all
other kinds of uniforms or from clothing in general.49 Nor will it
do to monopolize a "market" like that for hauling garments on
hangers in less than truckload lots over the highways from New
York City to Pennsylvania. 50 In many cases an inference of preda-
tion from otherwise suspect conduct must fail because the market
has been defined so narrowly as to bear little or no relationship to
reality.5' Reasonable market definition would eliminate twelve of
the fifty-five cases discussed in Appendix A from the true predatory
pricing cases. 52
Thirdly, the paradigm requires the predator to have a danger-
ous probability of successfully monopolizing a realistically defined
market. The predator must be able to do so within a time that will
not entail losses so great that it has little or no chance of recovering
them after he becomes a monopolist.5 3 Thus, the predator should
ence of predation failed because prices were above average total (long run incremental)
costs were Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT & T Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Spint), and MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983). Even though the district court in the Sprint case had found that barriers to entry into
inter-city long distance telephone service were low, it seemed best to rely on the fact that
prices were above long run incremental costs rather than to stretch the barriers to entry
point. It is interesting to note, however, that a considerable amount of entry has taken
place in that market both by private and by common carriers. Only two additional cases
would be eliminated by moving from an average total cost test to a short nonmarginal cost
test. See SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981); Pacific Eng'g &
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Co., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 58-
68 infra.
49 United States v. Crowll, Collier and MacMillian, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
50 International Dist. Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 618 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). On the basis of such a market definition, plaintiff obtained treble damages of some
$39,000,000 plus attorney's fees; the district court refused to grant judgment n.o.v. for the
defendant.
51 The market definition problem is an intimate part of the dangerous probability of
success and barriers to entry questions. The more narrowly the market is defined, the eas-
ier it will be to find a dangerous probability of successful monopolization but the harder it
will be to find barriers to entry. The converse will be true the more widely the market is
defined. The problem of market definition thus is not really separable from the dangerous
probability and barriers to entry issues. It seems better to set it forth separately, however,
because many courts have ignored this problem or have accepted unrealistic market
definitions.
52 See Appendix B.
53 The speed with which the alleged predator can accomplish his goal of monopolizing
is an important factor in deciding whether an inference of predation is justified. In Matsu-
shita, for example, the alleged conspiracy to predate had continued for some twenty years.
Similarly, the alleged predation in Inglis had continued for approximately ten years. In
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start with a substantial share of a realistically defined market and
should not face rivals of equal or greater size and/or staying power.
Inability to prove this requirement would defeat an inference of
predation in twenty-five of the fifty-five cases set forth in appendix
A.54
Fourthly, the predator must be able to raise prices high enough
after it becomes a monopolist and keep them there long enough at
least to recoup his predatory losses. This problem is usually ana-
lyzed in terms of barriers to entry.55 The absence of barriers to
entry would defeat a legitimate inference of predation in thirty-two
of the fifty-five cases set forth in appendix A.5 6
Another problem that has received remarkably little attention
is how the predator turned monopolist can avoid being hit with
treble damage actions by its overcharged buyers. Price fixers and
the like who do their dirty work in secret have some chance of
avoiding the wages of section 4 of the Clayton Act. But predators
do not work in secret. They must kill their rivals in open combat,
and their rivals are sure to let the world know. Customers of those
who become monopolists by pricing predatorily most surely lie in
gleeful wait for the day when the predator begins to recoup. And if
they do not, surely the plaintiff's antitrust bar does. The lack of
mention of these cases in the dispatches tells us something about
the incidence of the four conditions listed above.
The spectre of future treble damages for unlawful monopoliza-
tion, however, does more than inform us about the incidence of the
other necessary conditions of predatory pricing. It is a matter of
substantive importance because it addresses the question of how rea-
sonable an inference of predation might be. Is it reasonable to sup-
pose that a firm would fight the predatory battle just for the
pleasure of paying treble damages to its subsequently overcharged
customers? The Supreme Court specifically addressed a compara-
both cases there was still much ground to cover before monopoly was realized. An infer-
ence of predation in such circumstances is wholly unjustified. The Court in Matsushita re-
marked that "[t]he alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its
asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist." 106 S. Ct.
at 1359.
54 See Appendix B.
55 In discussing predatory pricing cases in terms of barriers to entry, this article does
not imply that barriers to entry are necessarily bad, or that it even follows that the existence
of barriers to entry along with the other necessary conditions of predation means that true
predation is present. To avoid a lengthy discussion of this point, suffice it to say for now
that "barriers to entry" are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a legitimate infer-
ence of predatory pricing even if all the other conditions are in fact present. Put another way,
assuming that all the other factors are present, the absence of barriers to entry defeats a
presumption of predation; the presence of such barriers does not validate that
presumption.
56 See Appendix B.
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ble issue in Matsushita: "Maintaining supracompetitive prices in
turn depends on the continued cooperation of the conspirators, on
the inability of other would-be competitors to enter the market, and
(not incidently) on the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust lia-
bility for their minimum price-fixing cartel."5 7 The ability to escape
liability for price fixing and the ability to escape liability for monop-
oly prices charged by an unlawfully obtained monopoly are func-
tionally indistinguishable in this context. It is hard to see why the
threat of such treble damages is not enough in itself to defeat a
legitimate inference of predation.
The scarcity of circumstances that meet the conditions set forth
above is borne out by the cases. I asked the following questions
about each of the fifty-five cases in Appendix A:
1. Were the allegedly predatory prices below average total
(long run incremental) cost?
2. Was the market realistically defined?
3. Did the defendant have a serious chance of monopolizing a
realistic market?
4. Were there significant barriers to entry or expansion in that
market?
A negative answer to any of these questions prevents a trier of fact
from inferring predation from suspicious behavior that might meet
all of the remaining tests.
Without stretching, one or more of these questions must be
answered in the negative in fifty-two of the fifty-five cases. Only
three cases are not eliminated by this four-question screen as candi-
dates for predatory pricing. The jury in one of these cases, Super-
Turf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co. ,58 found that the defendant's conduct was
not predatory and the judgment entered on that verdict was upheld
by the court of appeals. In a second case, Pacific Engineering & Pro-
duction Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. ,59 the court of appeals reversed the
district court's judgment that the defendant had engaged in preda-
tory pricing. Only one case in which the defendant was found to
have engaged in predatory pricing, D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix
and Contracting Co. ,60 passes muster under the four-question screen
set forth above. I will examine these three cases more closely.
The jury in SuperTurf found that Monsanto had not engaged in
predatory pricing of Astro Turf; the court of appeals upheld the
judgment entered on that verdict largely because there was no evi-
dence that Astro Turf prices ever dropped below Monsanto's aver-
age variable cost. I might have excluded this case as a candidate for
57 106 S. Ct. at 1359.
58 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981).
59 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
60 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the real thing on the ground that Monsanto could not recoup its
predatory losses by raising prices to monopoly levels. I did not,
however, because there was little or no information in the court of
appeals opinion about barriers to entry and because I wished to
include all cases that were even plausible contenders. There were
two or three other firms in the industry, however, and Monsanto's
large market share stemmed largely from a superior product. It
seems clear, as the court and jury concluded, that Monsanto was
simply competing vigorously for artificial turf sales and that no real
predatory pricing existed.
SuperTurf6 l is one of only two cases listed in Appendix A which
the short run marginal/average variable cost test would signifi-
cantly help to decide. Summaryjudgment could have been granted
both in this case and in Pacific Engineering if predatory prices were
limited to prices below the alleged predator's short run marginal or
average variable cost.
In Pacific Engineering 62 four firms had been producing ammo-
nium perchlorate (A/P), a chemical used almost exclusively as an
oxidizer in solid rocket fuel, when the demand for that product fell
sharply due to changes in defense policy. Two of the producers
withdrew from the market and mothballed their plants. 63 Of the
two remaining firms, the plaintiff "was a one-product company
which was vastly undercapitalized, while AMPOT [defendant] was
larger and more diversified." 64 The court stated the dilemma
which these firms faced as follows:
Excess capacity was precisely the problem facing AMPOT
and PE. Each had plant capacity sufficient to supply substan-
tially the entire demand for A/P. Individually, AMPOT and PE
faced demand curves sharply responsive to price. With the
nearly identical products, a small price cut by either of them
could result in the acquisition of nearly all the business. Each of
them also faced consistently decreasing marginal costs. Addi-
tional units of A/P could be produced at less cost than previous
units. In this situation each competitor would be tempted to
lower price and expand output to reach a lower point on its
marginal cost curve. This in turn would drive the other compet-
itor back up its marginal cost curve and increase its losses at the
new, lower price.6 5
The court noted that the possible outcomes of such a situation
were a price war to the death of one of the firms or some type of
collusion between them to share the market and raise prices. The
61 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981).
62 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 792.
65 Id. at 796 (footnote omitted).
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court rightly concluded that antitrust policy favored war to the
death rather than collusion. 66 Any other result would have pro-
tected competitors at the expense of competition. Believing that
the defendant's behavior was competitive, the court of appeals re-
versed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff.
I might have eliminated this case on the ground that the con-
tinued existence of other "mothballed" plants would prevent the
defendant from raising prices to monopoly levels. That is problem-
atic, however, since it appeared that the defendant's costs declined
throughout almost the entire range of output required to satisfy ex-
isting demand. The existence of such cost and demand conditions,
however, is enough in itself to negate any legitimate inference of
predation, as the court of appeals recognized.
While the court of appeals correctly concluded that the defend-
ant's pricing had not been predatory, the facts of Pacific Engineering
raise some interesting speculative questions. Suppose that the de-
fendant's prices had fallen below its marginal or average variable
costs. Should the result have been different? If so, what remedy
would have been appropriate? These questions are interesting be-
cause of the disagreement they would probably produce. While an
answer to them is not necessary to maintain the theses advanced in
this article, nothing in the Pacific Engineering opinion leads to a con-
clusion that the result should have been different even if the de-
fendant had priced below its own short run marginal cost.67 In one
actual event, however, as long as defendant's prices remained
above its average variable cost, as they in fact did,68 a staightfor-
ward application of the short run marginal/average variable cost
test, as opposed to an average total cost test, would have made it
easier for the court to decide this case.
Sierra Redi-Mix69 is the only case to survive the four-question
screen in which the plaintiff actually prevailed. Indeed, it is the
only predatory pricing case in which a plaintiff has prevailed in the
courts of appeals since 1975. Defendant was the only maker of
ready-mix concrete in Sierra Vista, Arizona, a town of about 7000
persons. Defendant successfully repelled the plaintiff, a small en-
trant who tried to compete only in that portion of the market made
up by nonunion contractors and individual home projects. Plaintiff
did not have the capability to make specification concrete required
by the Arizona Highway Department and a nearby military base and
66 Id.
67 See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REv. 869
(1976).
68 551 F.2d at 792.
69 D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix and Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.
1982).
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union contractors would not patronize the plantiff's nonunion
operation.
The court of appeals noted that this was not a "classic preda-
tory pricing case." 70 Defendant's owner had created a new com-
pany to compete directly with the plaintiff and caused another
company he owned to provide equipment, materials, and credit on
favorable terms.71 The new company granted extensive long-terrm
credit to its customers, who found this attractive because they often
did not get paid until they finished the job for which the concrete
was required. The extension of this credit and the new company's
relationship with the individual owner and his other company made
the relationship between the new company's prices and costs uncer-
tain. Plaintiff's expert testified on the basis of certain assumptions
that the defendant's prices were below average variable costs at
least at some times during the period of alleged predation. 72 De-
fendant apparently did not try to rebut this testimony, to its subse-
quent chagrin. The court of appeals held that the burden of
showing that the prices were not predatory shifted to the defendant
once the plaintiff introduced some evidence that they were below
average variable cost. Thus, the price/cost issue was decided prin-
cipally on the base of presumptions and lack of evidence.
It is hard to know just what to make of this case. Surely there
are many towns of more than 7000 persons that have only one sup-
plier of ready-mix concrete. Indeed, many towns probably have no
local supplier at all. Some of these towns may not be relevant mar-
kets by themselves, as might have been the case with Sierra Vista.78
It might also be doubted that ready-mix concrete used for home
improvement projects and nonunion contractors is a market sepa-
rate from concrete that is mixed on the job, particularly where la-
bor costs are as low as they are near the U.S.-Mexican border. It
might also be that the Sierra Vista case is like Pacific Engineering in
that such a small town may be a one-firm market. This is suggested
by the fact that several small concrete mixers had entered the mar-
ket before the plaintiff made the attempt, but all had withdrawn
within a short time.
But all this is speculation. The fact is that one case survives my
four-question screen. That screen cannot eliminate Sierra Vista
without stretching matters too far. It does not, of course, follow
70 Id. at 1248.
71 Id. at 1247.
72 The expert testified that on the basis of one set of assumptions the defendant's
prices were below average variable costs for the first nine months after the plaintiff's entry;
on the basis of other assumptions prices were below that level only during some months.
Id. at 1248.
73 The town of Bisbee, Arizona is about thirty miles away.
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that predatory pricing was actually involved in that case, in the
sense that the plaintiff's demise su.btracted more from the sum of
consumer and producer surplus than it added. There is, however,
no way to answer that question on the basis of the sparse facts that
the court of appeals included in its opinion. In my judgment, there
probably was no real predatory pricing present in Sierra Vista. If
there was, however, the potatoes were pretty small.
D. Conclusion
Thus far we have seen that the outburst of academic writing on
predatory pricing that started in 1975 either caused or was associ-
ated with a sharp increase in the number of cases on that subject.
From essentially no cases in the thirty years preceding 1975, the
number jumped to approximately fifty-five in the next twelve years.
We have also seen that the academic emphasis on a cost-based test
for predatory pricing has led many courts to overemphasize the
price/cost issue at the expense of other conditions that must neces-
sarily be present before predatory pricing can be inferred
legitimately.
The recent Matsushita case, however, has reemphasized both
the implausible nature of predatory pricing and the factors other
than below-cost pricing which must be present before such pricing
can be inferred. That case also indicates that the implausibility of
predatory pricing places a considerable evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs attempting to defeat summary motions by defendants.
I have argued that the courts should follow the lead of the FTC
and examine briefly the evidence on all of the necessary elements of
the claims before them. They should then focus specifically on
those most easy to decide. If courts adopt this approach, they will
almost certainly decide predatory pricing cases on summary mo-
tions in increasing numbers for defendants.
If that does not happen, we may have to turn to the concept of
antitrust injury to limit the number of counterproductive predatory
pricing cases that have found their way into court. I consider that
subject in the next section.
II. Predatory Pricing and Antitrust Injury
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 74 announced in 1977
that plaintiffs in private treble damage actions must prove "anti-
trust injury." Plaintiffs, which operated bowling alleys, sought to
recover for damages they suffered when Brunswick acquired and
operated some competing bowling centers. Brunswick manufac-
74 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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tured bowling alley equipment and had acquired individual alleys
that had defaulted on equipment payments. It operated those al-
leys that covered their average variable costs; it closed those that
did not.75
Even though Brunswick acquired bowling alleys only to collect
for equipment it had sold and owned less than 2% of the bowling
alleys in the country, the lower courts held that Brunswick had vio-
lated section 7 of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs argued that this viola-
tion injured them in that their profits would have been higher if
Brunswick had not acquired their competitors and continued to op-
erate them. 76
The Supreme Court rejected this theory. It held that to re-
cover damages, a plaintiff had to show more than a violation of sec-
tion 7 and a causal link between that violation and the alleged
injury. The Court said:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effects either of the violation
or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.77
Although Brunswick created the doctrine of antitrust injury, it left
the nature of that doctrine quite unclear.
California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp. 78 adds to the un-
derstanding of antitrust injury. Plaintiffs there claimed that IBM
had monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for IBM
compatible peripheral equipment. The court of appeals wrote:
Satisfying the latter burden [to show antitrust injury] is depen-
dent on a showing that the injury was caused by a reduction,
rather than an increase, in competition flowing from the defend-
ant's acts, since "[t]he antitrust laws ... were enacted for the
protection of competition not competitors." Accordingly, theplaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was in-
tended to or did have some anticompetitive effect beyond his
own loss of business or the market's loss of a competitor.79
The court concluded that "IBM's price cuts were a part of the very
competitive process the Sherman Act was designed to promote." 80
Taken together, Brunswick and CalComp indicate that antitrust
injury must be defined independently of plaintiff's loss of business
and the number of competitors in the market. This conclusion
75 Id. at 479.80.
76 Id. at 480-81.
77 Id. at 489.
78 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
79 Id. at 732 (emphasis added, and citations omitted).
80 Id. at 742.
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leads to the question of how an injury to competition can be shown
in the context of predatory behavior without relying on injury to
competitors. An economist knows the answer to that question im-
mediately. Something injures competition when it reduces eco-
nomic efficiency.8 ' An act can injure competition and thereby
create antitrust injury only when it creates a market inefficiency.8 2
81 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 58-61 (1978).
82 See Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 467, 471 (1980). He wrote about this as follows:
Such a basis [for identifying antitrust injury] is provided, however, by the rec-
ognition that antitrust policy should be directed toward promoting efficiency, or as
some prefer to call it, consumer welfare. The "rule of reason" narrows the class of
illegal restraints from all those that limit any individual's commercial freedom to
those that limit the efficient operation of markets generally. In parallel fashion,
antitrust injury can consistently be seen as narrowing the standard for recoverable
damages from all those suffered by the plaintiff as a result of an antitrust violation
to those that actually flow from the aspect of the violation that causes market
inefficiency.
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A plaintiff can show antitrust injury under this standard only by
identifying the market inefficiency which the antitrust violation
causes and then showing that its damages flow from that
inefficiency.
Take, for example, a consumer injured by price fixing. Pc is the
competitive price in Figure 1. Suppose the members of the indus-
try cartelize and raise price to Pm, restricting output from Qc to
Qm. This creates a market inefficiency equal to triangles X2 and
X3. Buyers are damaged by the higher price which is directly asso-
ciated with such market inefficiency.
The size of the loss suffered by those who continue to buy from
the cartel members equals to the rectangle ABCD. The relation-
ship between that loss and the antitrust injury which the cartel in-
flicts on the economy (triangles X2 and X3) is such that we can
safely say that the overcharged buyers have suffered damages that
flowed from the antitrust injury which the price fixing caused.8 3
This antitrust injury can come into existence, however, only if a car-
tel raises price above marginal cost.8 4
Similar inefficiencies may result from prices below marginal
cost. Price Pp in Figure 1 creates an inefficiency measured by the
triangle Xl. That inefficiency occurs because consumers value the
output over the range Qc-Qp at amounts increasingly less than
the incremental cost of its production. The measure of consumer
value declines from G to F as output increases from Qc to Qp, while
the marginal cost of producing that output rises from G to E. Soci-
ety would be wealthier if the resources used to produce output
Qc-Qp produced something else that consumers valued at least as
highly as the marginal cost of its production.
The relationship between the inefficiency caused by predatory
prices that drop below marginal cost and the undercharges associ-
ated with such pricing is conceptually similar to the relationship be-
tween the inefficiency caused by cartel prices that rise above
marginal cost and the overcharges associated with such pricing.
We permit buyers from the cartel to recover because their damages
are causally connected with an antitrust injury; there is a similar
connection between antitrust injury and damages suffered by com-
Id.
83 The relationship between the market inefficiency and the overcharge to buyers will
vary with the price elasticity of demand (the slope of demand curve) and the elasticity of
supply for inputs (the slope of marginal cost curve). See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATrONs 285-87 (1976).
84 Prices above marginal cost are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for non-
optimal resource allocation. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in
Concentrated Industries, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1231 (1978).
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petitors of a predator who prices below marginal cost.8 5
The important point is that when we focus only on the preda-
tory period, antitrust injury (market inefficiency) occurs only if the
predator cuts prices below its own marginal cost. Unless prices fall
below the putative predator's marginal cost, therefore, its competi-
tors should be foreclosed from treble damage recoveries by the ab-
sence of antitrust injury. This would be true even if the price is
legally held to become predatory before it drops below marginal
cost, as it may well be if the legal rule is not based on a marginal
cost standard. 86
It might seem surprising at first that the plaintiff could show
the defendant's prices were "predatory" and still not recover dam-
ages unless it also showed that those prices were below marginal
cost. But that is the nature of the antitrust injury doctrine. That is
precisely what happened in Brunswick. Plaintiff showed a violation
of the antimerger law but was denied recovery because of failure to
show that its damages were related to an injury to competition
(market inefficiency) that flowed from that violation.
The antitrust injury question cannot, however, be disposed of
entirely by focusing only on the predatory period. We must also
consider the possibility that today's predator will become to-
morrow's monopolist. Suppose that it does. Does the monopoly
pricing cause an antitrust injury that could plausibly support an ac-
tion by the predator's competitors for injury they suffered during
the predatory period? This is best answered by tracing through a
predatory scenario.
Suppose a predator predates its way to "monopoly"87 and then
85 It should be noted that these undercharges are not the same as the decline in the
competitors' going concern value. The usual view seems to be that the decline in going
concern value is the appropriate measure of damages in this type of case. See Indian Coffee
Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 900 (3d Cir. 1985); Page, Antitrust Damages
and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 467, 485 (1980).
This view is incorrect. A competitor should not recover for injuries it suffers from all price
cuts. The injury results only from those price cuts which are illegal and which flow from an
identifiable antitrust injury. By analogy to the price fixing case, the competitors' damages
should not exceed three times the predator's undercharges or perhaps three times the dif-
ference between the market price and the predator's marginal cost times the output which
the competitor sold at that price during the predatory period.
86 No contemporary legal standard is based on a strict marginal cost standard. The
Areeda-Turner test uses average variable cost because of the difficulty of determining mar-
ginal cost. Some courts have said prices can be predatory even if they are above average
total cost. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983). Thus, a discrepency between a finding of a predatory price
and the absence of antitrust injury could arise even if we substituted average variable cost
for marginal cost in the discussion in the text.
87 To become a "monopolist" in this context means simply that the former predator
obtains a large share of the market. Some, perhaps many, of his former competitor victims
will still be in the market with him when he becomes a "monopolist." While they will suffer
from the low prices extant during the predatory period, they will benefit from the high
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raises prices above "competitive" levels to recoup its predatory
losses. Leaving aside the possibility that the predator creates or
exploits productive efficiencies in becoming a monopolist,8 8 those
increased prices will create an inefficiency similar to that created by
the cartel discussed above. This will create an antitrust injury (an
injury to competition) which may support some type of treble dam-
age action.
But a plaintiff cannot show that it has suffered from antitrust
injury just by showing an inefficiency somewhere in the relevant
market. Plaintiff's injury must "flow" from the antitrust injury, i.e.,
in some sense be caused by it or at least be "inextricably inter-
twined" with the antitrust injury.8 9 The inefficiency (antitrust in-
jury) created when the monopolist raises prices clearly bears the
requisite relationship to the monopolistic overcharges. The mo-
nopolist's customers have suffered damages that flow from an anti-
trust injury and they may recover treble damages. But what is the
relationship between the antitrust injury caused by monopolistic
pricing and the losses suffered by the monopolist's competitors
during the period of predation?
First, there is no relationship between the existence of antitrust
injury caused by monopolistic pricing and losses the monopolist's
competitors may suffer during a preceding predatory period.
Those competitors may suffer losses during a predatory period but
the predator may never be able to raise prices to monopolistic
levels. Conversely, monopolists may be able to raise prices for rea-
sons largely unrelated to any previous predation. Either the preda-
tory low prices and/or a subsequent ability to maintain
monopolistic prices may, for example, be a manifestation of emerg-
ing economies of scale and/or shifts in demand. These underlying
economic factors might be causally related both to the "predatory"
prices and to the later "monopoly" prices; there need be no causal
relation between the predatory prices and the monopoly prices at
all. 90 Neither courts nor administrative agencies will be able to dis-
tinguish between these different cases.
Certainly the relationship between antitrust injury caused by
monopoly and the damages competitors may suffer during the
predatory period is vastly different from the relationship between
monopoly antitrust injury and the damage inflicted on the monopo-
list's overcharged customers. In the latter relationship, the
prices that presumably must exist during the monopoly period in order to justify the preda-
tory campaign.
88 See authorities cited in note 84 supra.
89 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
90 A related point is made in Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment,
89 HARv. L. REV. 869, 887-88 (1976).
1986] 1073
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
overcharges cannot occur without causing the antitrust injury91 and
the antitrust violation cannot exist unless the overcharges occur.
Nothing remotely similar to that can be said about the causal rela-
tionship between the monopolistic antitrust injury and the injury
suffered by competitors during the predatory period.92
Second, there is no general relationship between the amount
of any antitrust injury caused by monopolistic pricing and the losses
which the monopolist's competitors may have suffered during the
predatory period. The efficiency losses (antitrust injury or injury to
competition) from monopoly pricing as well as the injury to con-
sumers from such pricing depend largely on how high and how
long the monopolist can raise its prices.93 A competitor's losses
from predation, on the other hand, depend primarily on how low
prices went during the predation period, how long the period
lasted, and upon the competitor's strategic responses to the preda-
tion.9 4 The size of the monopoly overcharges bears no general re-
lationship to the size of losses suffered by competitors during the
predatory period and vice versa.
Third, a predator's competitors are never injured by the high
prices which a predator may charge after becoming a monopolist.
Those higher prices and the antitrust injury associated with them
actually benefit those firms that remain in the market with the "mo-
nopolist." They will increase both output and profits as the mo-
nopolist restricts its output to increase market prices.9 5 A
competitor cannot show antitrust injury from low prices by arguing
that its damage from low prices is somehow related to later damage
to consumers from high prices-when such high prices could never
91 Always with the caveat that productive efficiencies associated with the monopoly may
be greater than the inefficiencies created by the monopolistic output restriction. See text
accompanying note 88 supra.
92 Look at Figure 1 to see this point. Triangle X2 + X3 is the antitrust injury caused by
monopoly pricing. Rectangle ABCD is the damage that monopoly prices inflict on consum-
ers. There is always a direct relationship between those two things. Rectangle DCHI is the
damage inflicted on competitors by the predator's low prices. There is no relationship
between that rectangle and triangle X2 + X3.
93 As noted above, these losses will also turn on the elasticity of supply and demand.
Neither of these factors need appreciably affect a competitor's losses from predation. They
could have such an effect if the competitor kept its output up in an attempt to satisfy the
demand unleashed by the low predatory prices, but a competitor need not do that. He may,
indeed, shut down during the predatory period and force even greater losses on the
predator itself.
94 See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1981).
95 This was recognized even in Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570
(10th Cir. 1985), which oddly found standing for a competitor to enjoin the merger of other
competitors on the grounds that the merger might enable them to engage in predatory pric-
ing. Brunswick was read broadly because the plaintiff in Monfort sought an injunction under
section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), rather than damages under section 4,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
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damage the competitor in any event. The only antitrust injury in
the picture-the inefficiency created by monopolistic pricing-does
not bear any discernible relationship to losses that competitors
might suffer during the predatory period.
One last problem will arise unless there is one economics-
based standard with which to analyze antitrust injury. A problem of
double recovery will arise if competitors are permitted to recover
for losses suffered during a "predation" which does not involve
prices below marginal cost and consumers are later allowed to re-
cover damages for the predator's subsequent overcharges. There is
only one efficiency loss or injury to competition in the entire preda-
tory scenario, so long as the predator's prices do not drop below
marginal cost.96 That is the dead weight loss associated with the
monopoly prices. The monopolist's overcharged customers can
base their recovery on that antitrust injury. If the predator's com-
petitors recover on the same inefficiency, however, double recovery
on the same antitrust injury would result. Such double recovery is
contrary to the policy that underlies the doctrines of standing97 and
antitrust injury that are designed to place realistic limitations on the
otherwise expansive language of section 4 of the Clayton Act.98
This analysis leads to the conclusion that predatory prices do
not create any antitrust injury unless they fall below the predator's
marginal cost. If they do not, a predator's competitors should not
be allowed to recover for damages unless they can show that those
damages are causally related to the antitrust injury associated with
the monopoly prices that the predator will supposedly charge once
he predates his way to the promised land. But the analysis also
shows that there is no such causal relationship. It follows, there-
fore, that under an efficiency-based concept of antitrust injury, a
predator's competitors should never be allowed to recover dam-
ages they suffer from low prices unless the predator's price drops
below its marginal cost. In such cases the competitor's measure of
damages should not exceed three times the difference between the
market price of the product and the predator's marginal cost.99
96 The predator's competitors will be able to recover damages they suffer from the
antitrust injury that results if the predator's prices do drop below his own marginal cost.
See text accompanying note 99 infra.
97 This is particularly clear from a case like Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977), where the possibility of double recovery is specifically used to justify denial of
standing to remote purchasers from a price fixer. This point is als made in Blue Shield v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
98 See Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127
(1976).
99 The courts have not used the antitrust injury doctrine to limit the recovery of a
predator's competitors in the way this article suggests. Neither the courts nor the commen-
tators, however, have thought through either the nature or the implications of the antitrust
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III. Conclusion
Antitrust is as subject to fads as any other human institution.
While the idea of predatory pricing has been with us a long time, it
has reached the fad level during the last decade or so. While plain-
tiffs and their lawyers have surely not grown rich in their pursuit of
this particular fad, they have done better than the alchemists of
old.' 00
Antitrust's concern with predatory pricing is a negative sum
game of perhaps considerable proportions. It may have made a few
plaintiffs and their lawyers somewhat better off, though more of
them have lost than gained. But the efforts of all of them-winners,
losers, and their unwilling defendants alike-must be counted as a
social loss. For they have produced nothing that anyone would be
willing to buy in a voluntary transaction. They have all been en-
gaged in the moral equivalent of a game of cops and robbers; worse
actually, because the defendants have not voluntarily entered the
fray as participants in a game that produces at least enough satisfac-
tion to keep the attention of its players. The defendants have been
dragooned into the action.
This would not be worth even the modest attention of a law
review article if the gains and losses were confined to voluntary par-
ticipants. But they are not. The search for treble damages in the
antitrust arena chills the price-cutting incentive of competitors far
from the scene of litigation. How much we do not know. But it
must be more than the social losses that could ever flow from pred-
atory pricing itself. Theory, history, and even an examination of
recent cases, shows that those losses are nonexistent or close
thereto.
The approach which the Supreme Court has taken in Matsushita
will hopefully move these cases quickly out of court and staunch the
flow of future litigation. Even if Matsushita produces this result, we
should refine our thinking about the nature of antitrust injury, both
in predatory pricing cases and more generally. Under either Matsu-
shita or a revised application of antitrust injury, there should be
fewer predatory pricing cases in the future. The sooner the better.
injury doctrine. That topic should be high on the agenda for future work. It would be
much more productive than another article about predatory pricing.
100 See generally C. MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS (London
1852).
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Appendix A
Predatory Pricing Cases
Decided From
January 1, 1975 Through April 30,
19861
1. *Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio Corp.2 The
Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had conspired to drive
them out of business by selling Japanese electronic equipment at
low prices in the United States. The Court noted that predation
was an extremely improbable inference to draw when circum-
stances would admit of more than one inference. That was particu-
larly true here where an alleged predatory conspiracy had
continued for some twenty years. The Court found that even if de-
fendants could later raise prices to monopoly levels, they could not
realistically expect to recoup the enormous loss that had occurred
during such a long period of alleged predation. Entry of other
firms would probably occur in response to monopoly prices and it
would be difficult to hold together an alleged conspiracy of
predators after they became monopolists. The Court found that
the improbability of predation under such circumstances must be
taken into account when deciding motions for summary judgment
in predation cases.
2. *Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co.3 The court of appeals af-
firmed judgment for defendant after a trial before a magistrate.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant had attempted to monopolize the
sale of lubricating oil in the Viburnum Trend, a lead producing
area in the state of Missouri. There was no dangerous probability
of success and nothing would have kept other firms from entering
the market if defendant had tried to raise prices to recoup its preda-
tory losses. The court noted that "[c]ompetition was stiff-some
seven oil suppliers were vying for the business of the four lead min-
ing companies." 4 In addition, buyers generally solicited new bids
each year. Summary judgment could have been granted for de-
fendant in this case on the basis of a market that was defined too
narrowly, lack of a dangerous probability of successful monopoliza-
1 An asterisk before the case name indicates that the case cited Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697
(1975).
2 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (this case produced a number of other decisions, the most
relevant of which are referred to in the Supreme Court opinion).
3 774 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1985).
4 Id. at 898.
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tion, and inability to raise prices to monopoly levels in the post-
predation period.
3. *National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co.5 The court
of appeals reversed the district court's judgment holding defendant
liable for attempted and actual monopolization of reporting serv-
ices for the United States Tax Court. Contracts were awarded an-
nually on bids. The Tax Court permitted the current holder of the
contract to continue at its current price, but put the contract out for
bids again if that holder tried to raise prices. In reversing, the court
of appeals wrote:
Even if we assume that Alderson's pricing was predatory as so
defined [by Areeda & Turner] and even if we assume predatory
intent, there is no evidence that Alderson ever possessed mo-
nopoly power. Alderson did not have the power to raise prices
or eliminate competitors . . . so it could not "[recoup] losses
through higher profits earned in the absence of competition." 6
This would have justified summary judgment for defendant; a result
reached in Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc. ,7 a similar case discussed
in paragraph 37 below.
4. Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.8 The court of ap-
peals reversed the district court's grant of a directed verdict for de-
fendant at the close of the plaintiff's case. Plaintiff alleged
geographic price discrimination, in violation of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, by Procter in its introduction of Folgers coffee into the
eastern part of the United States in the early 1970s. Plaintiff made
no claim of monopolization, nor could there have been such a claim
given the intensive competition in those markets between Procter
and General Foods. The FTC dismissed a similar Robinson-Pat-
man Act complaint.9 The court of appeals held in this case that the
evidence was sufficient for the matter to go to the jury on the
Robinson-Patman issue. It seems clear, however, that summary
judgment could have been granted for defendant on any claim
under section 2 of the Sherman Act; Procter was in fact a new en-
trant into the plaintiff's market where the dominant firm had been
General Foods. It is simply not plausible that Procter was attempt-
ing to monopolize or actually could have monopolized eastern cof-
fee markets.
5. Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc. t0 The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's grant of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.
5 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985), rev k 567 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
6 763 F.2d at 1023 (citations omitted).
7 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
8 752 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1985), rev' 482 F. Supp. 1104 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
9 103 F.T.C. 204, 332 (1984).
10 742 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984).
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on Sherman Act claims. Plaintiff was a terminated former distribu-
tor of Airco's industrial gases in Portland, Oregon. After the termi-
nation, Airco started its own distribution operation and cut gas
prices in order to get its old customers back from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged an attempt to monopolize via pricing below cost.
While there was some evidence that some of Airco's prices were
below average variable cost, the court of appeals affirmed because
the evidence of predatory pricing was insufficient.
This was strictly a vertical case. Airco was attempting to regain
its old customers to which it had previously sold gas through plain-
tiff. Even if Airco had been totally successful in this respect, driving
plaintiff out of business in the process, Airco's share of the generic
gas market would not have been any larger than it was before. This
case, therefore, could have been decided summarily for defendant
regardless of the relationship between Airco's prices and costs.
6. *Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. "' The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. The market was defined as renting cars
to insurance companies that were required to replace cars of their
insureds that had been stolen or wrecked. The court stated that
barriers to entry were "slight-not negligible, perhaps, but assur-
edly not so great as to permit a monopoly born of predatory pricing
to be exploited before new competitors would scotch the potential
for extranormal profits."' 2 Summary judgment for defendant
could have been granted on this point alone.
7. *Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. AT&T Co.13 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment for defend-
ant, principally because defendant's prices never dropped below
long run incremental cost. Summary judgment for defendant
would have been justified on this basis.
8. *Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.14 The district
court entered a judgment for plaintiff following a jury verdict in its
favor on claims of monopolization and attempted monopolization
of the market for asphalt highway paving contracts let by the Ohio
Department of Transportation and the Ohio Turnpike Commission
in a thirteen county area in northwest Ohio. The court of appeals
vacated the judgment because the evidence showed that defend-
ant's bids were above its own average total cost, even though they
may have been below plaintiff's costs. The court observed that the
antitrust laws did not require a party to price above its competitor's
costs, since this would deprive parties of their rewards from greater
11 735 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984).
12 id at 893.
13 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'g 556 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1983).
14 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir. 1984).
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efficiency. 15 Since it was undisputed that its prices were not below
average total cost, this case could have been decided by summary
judgment for defendant.
9. Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co. 16 The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defend-
ant in relevant part because defendant's prices for its full product
line were above average total cost. The court refused to find preda-
tion just because 32 ounce bottles of soft drinks may have been
priced below cost, when the full product line was not. The issue
here was primarily a legal one; once the "instrument of predation"
was defined as defendant's entire product line rather than 32 ounce
bottles of the soft drinks involved, the case could have been de-
cided summarily for defendant.
10. *Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp. 1 7 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's judgment for defendant after a
trial before the court. Plaintiff alleged that Grinnell helped Pacific
Scientific Co. exclude plaintiff from the market for mechanical
snubbers used in building nuclear reactors. Grinnell was a buyer of
such snubbers, had tried to develop Barry as a supplier, and turned
to Pacific only when Barry was unable to produce snubbers satisfac-
torily. Prices were above average total cost. In addition, as Frank
Easterbrook has pointed out, it would not have been in Grinnell's
interest to help Pacific become a snubber monopolist since Grinnell
was a buyer of that product.18 Summary judgment would have
been appropriate here, in that prices were not below average total
cost and because defendant had no plausible reason to support Pa-
cific's alleged monopolistic ventures.
11. *D.E. Rogers Associates Inc. v. Gardner-Denver Co. 19 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's
claims of violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robin-
son-Patman Act. The relevant market was nut setters. The court of
appeals found defendant's share of that market to be 10-15%o. The
court also found that there were no significant barriers to entry.
Since defendant held a relatively small part of the market, the court
could also have rested its decision on the absence of a dangerous
probability of successful monopolization. Summary judgment for
defendant would be appropriate in fact situations such as this.
15 Id. at 1055-56.
16 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'g 543 F. Supp. 1255 (W.D. La. 1982).
17 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'g Barry Wright Corp. v. Pacific Scientific Corp., 555
F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mass 1983).
18 See Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25 (1984). For a criticism of
this point that does not cover the actual situation in Bany Wright, see Markovits, The Limits to
Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 78 (1984).
19 718 F.2d 1431 (6th Cir. 1983).
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12. *MCI Communications Corp. v. A T&T Co. 20 The court of ap-
peals found that defendant's prices for certain telephonic services
were not predatory because they remained at or above long run
incremental cost. Summary judgment for defendant would be ap-
propriate when the alleged predator's prices remain above its aver-
age total cost.2 '
13. *Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.22 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's judgment that IBM had not mo-
nopolized central processing units and peripheral computing
equipment. Prices were above average total cost and defendant did
not have a dangerous probability of successful monopolization. In
addition, customers would have switched back to other suppliers
(such as plaintiff) if IBM tried to raise prices later to recover losses
incurred during the period of alleged predation. See paragraphs 27,
30, and 36 of this Appendix for similar cases. Prices above average
total cost would justify summary judgment for defendant, as would
the fact that defendant would not have been able to raise prices
without attracting entry or expansion in the relevant market.
14. Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University.23 The court of ap-
peals reversed summary judgment for plaintiff on its claim that de-
fendant had attempted to monopolize the market for books around
Temple University. Plaintiff had set up a trailer at the beginning of
the college term to sell the most popular textbooks at low prices.
The college bookstore cut prices in response and this action re-
sulted. There was no discussion of the relevant geographic market.
The court concluded that defendant had not reduced prices below
average variable cost, but the case could have been decided on the
basis of the University's inability to raise prices to monopoly levels
following a period of predation. Prices could not have been in-
creased to such levels because plaintiff or others could easily repeat
the activities that had led to this litigation. Additionally, it is not
clear that the college campus was a relevant geographic market.
Summary judgment for defendant in this case would have been ap-
propriate principally because of defendant's inability to raise prices
to monopoly levels.
15. *Zoslaw v. MCA Distribution Co.24 The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defend-
20 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
21 Summary judgment would not be justified on this basis in a jurisdiction in which
prices above average total cost could be regarded as predatory, which is the case at the
moment in the Ninth Circuit. The statement in the text is meant to refer to the historical
test which typically refused to find predatory intent when prices exceeded the defendant's
average total cost.
22 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Ca. 1979).
23 697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982), vacating 524 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
24 693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ant on the plaintiff's charge of an attempt to monopolize the retail
record and tape market in the San Francisco Bay Area. The only
relevant defendant had two stores and less than 10% of sales in that
area. There was no dangerous probability of success. Nor could
defendant raise prices to monopoly levels without inducing massive
entry or expansion. Summary judgment for defendant was granted
in this case and affirmed.
16. D&S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co.25 The
court of appeals affirmed judgment for plaintiff entered after remit-
titur on ajury verdict in a suit brought under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. From 1956 until 1969, defendant was "virtually" the
only maker of ready-mix concrete in Sierra Vista, Arizona. A few
smaller firms had entered and quickly left; plaintiff entered in 1969.
Plaintiff's proof showed that defendant opened another ready-mix
plant to compete more directly with plaintiff in the non-union and
non-specification concrete markets. Plaintiff's expert testified on
the basis of one set of assumptions that the new company's prices
were below average variable cost for the first nine months of its life;
on other assumptions price was below such cost only during some
of those months. The court found that defendant had not proved
that its prices were justified "without regard to their destructive ef-
fect on competition" as it was required to do under IngliS 2 6 once
plaintiff had shown some prices to be below average variable cost.
It is hard to see from the facts mentioned in the opinion of the
court of appeals how summary judgment could have been granted
to the defendant in this case. This case is discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 69-73.
17. *Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp.27 The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of a directed verdict
for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff had charged
attempted monopolization of ready-mix concrete in the Cincinnati,
Ohio area. A number of other firms had entered during the alleged
period of predation. The district court had found that defendant
had no dangerous probability of success (with a maximum market
share of 44%) and that entry was "fairly easy" at least on a small
level. 28 The grant of a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case suggests that the case could have been decided for defendant
on summary judgment.
25 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
26 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1981).
27 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982), aff'g 547 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
28 Id. at 824.
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18. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. 29 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judg-
ment for defendant on plaintiff's claim that it was injured because it
had to increase the amount of its discounts because of defendant's
alleged predatory pricing. Plaintiff had failed to prove that its in-
creased discounts were caused, at least to some extent, by the al-
leged predatory pricing. Plaintiff also made no attempt to show
what part of such increase resulted from the alleged predatory pric-
ing. The court concluded that there was no evidence of any injury
which resulted from defendant's alleged anticompetitive actions.
The absence of such evidence suggests that this case could have
been decided on a motion for summary judgment.
19. *Dimmitt Agri Industries v. CPC International Inc.30 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment for plaintiff
entered after it refused to grant defendant's motion for judgment
n.o.v. Plaintiff had charged that defendant (the old Corn Products
Co.) had monopolized and attempted to monopolize the markets
for corn starch and corn syrup. The court of appeals reversed be-
cause defendant had only 25%o and 17% of those markets, respec-
tively. That was not enough to support a finding of
monopolization. The court ordered a new trial on the attempt
charge, on which the jury had found for defendant. Even on the
attempt claim, however, it would seem that a court could easily find
summarily for defendant because of the lack of a dangerous
probability of successful monopolization and/or because defendant
would not have been able to charge monopoly prices without in-
ducing entry or the expansion of existing facilities.
20. *Borden, Inc. v. FTC.31 The court of appeals upheld a FTC
order finding that Borden's subsidiary, ReaLemon, had unlawfully
maintained monopoly power in the market for reconstituted lemon
juice. While the Commission brought this case under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, the court applied the same
standards it would apply to an unlawful maintenance of monopoly
power under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC found that
ReaLemon had unlawfully maintained monopoly power through
geographic price discrimination and "unreasonably low prices."
The Commission believed that ReaLemon's prices were "unreason-
ably low" because they forced a competitor to sell at a loss. This
occurred because ReaLemon was able to command a 30% price
premium over competitive brands because of superior consumer
acceptance. In spite of this, the Commission insisted that the com-
29 690 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1982).
30 679 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982).
31 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982).
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petitor (Golden Crown) was just as efficient as ReaLemon. The evi-
dence also showed that Golden Crown's costs were reduced
because it adulterated its product. ReaLemon estimated this adul-
teration reduced Golden Crown's costs by about 20%.
The analysis of this case was badly handled because of an in-
ability to avoid making value judgments about the strong prefer-
ence that consumers had for ReaLemon as compared to less
popular brands such as Golden Crown. Professor Scherer has sug-
gested that "an image advantage, permitting the maintenance of a
price premium, is conceptually analogous to a unit cost advan-
tage." 32 If the 30% price premium ReaLemon was able to charge
for its product were deducted from its nominal costs, it seems un-
likely that prices for ReaLemon ever would have fallen below
ReaLemon's adjusted average total costs. If the treatment of price
premiums suggested by Professor Scherer is accepted as the law,
this case apparently could have been decided for defendant on
summary judgment.
21. SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co. 33 The court of appeals af-
firmed judgment for defendant entered on a verdict rejecting plain-
tiff's claim that defendant had violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Defendant's prices had not dropped below its average variable
cost. This case could have been decided on a motion for summary
judgment if the law required prices to be below average variable
cost before they could be held to be predatory. Under the more
traditional average total cost test, however, this case could not have
been decided on a motion for summary judgment. This is one of
only two cases set forth in this Appendix that could have been de-
cided more readily under the Areeda-Turner test than under the
more traditional test for predation. The other case, Pacific Eng'g &
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 34 is discussed in paragraph 33 below.
22. *0. Hommell Co. v. Ferro Corp.3 5 The court of appeals re-
fused to find competitive injury and reversed the district court
judgment entered on ajury verdict for plaintiff on a Robinson-Pat-
man claim. The jury had found for defendant on plaintiff's claim
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Defendant's share of the mar-
ket for porcelain enamel frit fell from 42% to 40% during the pe-
riod of alleged predation, while the shares of the second and third
largest firms increased. The share of the fourth largest firm (plain-
tiff) remained about the same while the fifth firm's share dropped
from 7% to about 5%. Predation on the basis of these facts seems
32 Scherer, Predato7y Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 889
(1976).
33 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981).
34 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
35 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981).
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an unlikely explanation for defendant's conduct even if its prices
had fallen below relevant costs. (Defendant's prices were appar-
ently below average total cost in some transactions, but not below
average variable cost.) An attempted monopolization claim here
could have been decided summarily on the grounds that defendant
had no reasonable probability of successfully monopolizing the
market for porcelain enamel frit.
23. *William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co.36 This case is discussed at length in text accompanying notes
25-43 of this article. As indicated there, this case could have been
readily decided on a motion for summary judgment.
24. *Northeastern Telephone Co. v. A T&T Co. 37 The court of ap-
peals reversed judgment for plaintiff on its claim that defendant
had engaged in predatory pricing to maintain its monopoly of sales
of business telephone equipment. The court held that prices at or
above marginal or average variable cost could not be predatory.
This case could have been decided for the defendant on a motion
for summary judgment. A large number of firms could have sup-
plied retailers like plaintiff if defendant had raised its prices after
plaintiff left the market. The fact that defendant could never have
recouped its allegedly predatory losses makes predation an implau-
sible explanation of the behavior challenged in this case.
25. *Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley.38 The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for judgment
n.o.v. on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to show
damage to plaintiff. Defendant's prices were always significantly
higher than plaintiff's prices and apparently significantly above av-
erage total cost as well. This case could, therefore, readily have
been decided on a motion for summary judgment.
26. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Service. 3 9 The court
of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's mo-
nopolization claim after a jury trial. The reversal was based on the
fact that the district court had instructed the jury that the monopo-
lization claim must fail unless plaintiff showed that defendant had at
least 50%o of the relevant market. Although the court of appeals
reversed because of this erroneous instruction, it went on to indi-
cate that monopoly power could not be inferred from "consistently
operating below cost while also realizing steady gains in its volume
of traffic." 40 Plaintiff had to show a relevant market and show de-
36 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981).
37 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
38 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners &
Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
39 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
40 Id. at 130.
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fendant's position in it as a condition of sustaining a charge of
predatory pricing. It is not possible to tell whether a properly
pleaded case based on the facts of this case could have been de-
cided summarily because plaintiff had not shown a relevant market
or defendant's share in it. Its failure to do so, on the other hand,
would justify summary judgment for defendant.
27. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp.4 1 The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict, granted after a full trial of eighty days. The court of
appeals reached this conclusion on the basis of its inability to distin-
guish this case from California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp.42
See paragraphs 13, 30, and 36 of this Appendix for similar cases. As
in the other IBM cases, the fact that prices were above average total
cost would justify summary judgment for defendant.
28. Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co.43 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's judgment for defendant on a jury
verdict. The court affirmed in part because plaintiff's counsel did
not object to an instruction that prices could not be predatory un-
less they were below marginal or average variable cost. While the
decision thus turned on price/cost issues there were other bases for
a decision in defendant's favor. Most particularly, the market was
defined as pork and pork products in Montana. Even if defendant
could have been successful in obtaining a monopoly in that market,
there is nothing to prevent others from shipping pork and pork
products into Montana from other places should defendant raise its
prices to monopoly levels. Moreover, defendant had 50% of the
defined market at the start of the predatory period while plaintiff
held 21%. Those percentages were unchanged at the end of the
period, so we may doubt a dangerous probability of success even
accepting the market as defined in this case. This would also sup-
port summary disposition in defendant's favor.
29. *Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp.44
The district court granted a directed verdict for defendant at the
close of plaintiff's case and the court of appeals affirmed. While the
court noted that prices were above average variable cost, it also
commented on the relative ease of entry. The case could have been
decided on the latter point without reference to the relationship
between price and cost. The directed verdict for defendant at the
close of plaintiff's case strongly suggests that the case could have
been decided for defendant on summary judgment.
41 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g per curiam ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
42 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
43 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980).
44 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
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30. *California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp.45 The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of a directed verdict
for defendant. As with the other IBM cases, summary judgment for
defendant would have been justified. See paragraphs 13, 27, and 36
of this Appendix for similar cases.
31. *Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc.46
The court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of an injunc-
tion preventing defendant from distributing free copies of its new
Sunday paper for five weeks and limiting such distribution to only
two weeks. Judge Friendly, for the court of appeals, found that de-
fendant did not have a dangerous probability of successfully mono-
polizing the Buffalo, New York newspaper market. The facts of this
case suggest that a summary judgment for defendant would have
been upheld if appealed.
32. Janich Brothers Inc. v. American Distilling Co.47 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's grant of a directed verdict for
defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant attempted to monop-
olize the sale of private label gin in California by charging allegedly
predatory prices for half-gallon bottles of the product. The court
did not mention defendant's market share. The case was decided
for defendant because its prices were not below average variable
cost. But even if they had been the case could have been decided
summarily for defendant because virtually nothing prevented
others from selling private label gin if defendant had obtained a
monopoly of this narrowly defined market and attempted to raise
prices therein. In addition, the price of private label gin is con-
strained by the price of branded gin. Finally, plaintiff had not made
any showing of a dangerous probability of successful
monopolization.
33. *Pacific Engineering & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.48 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment for plaintiff
on plaintiff's charge that defendant had monopolized and at-
tempted to monopolize the market for ammonium perchlorate
(A/P), a chemical used exclusively as an oxidizer in solid rocket
fuel. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 62-68.
The Areeda-Turner test would have facilitated decision of this case.
34. *C. 0. Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.49 The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's order directing a verdict for defendant in
part and ordering a new trial. Plaintiff was a spectacularly unsuc-
cessful retailer of gasoline who, after his failure, charged Shell Oil
45 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
46 601 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1979).
47 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977).
48 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
49 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).
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with attempting to monopolize an unspecified market by charging
low prices which he made no attempt to show were below any par-
ticular costs. There is nothing appreciable to prevent parties from
entering the retail gasoline market, which Shell has no apparent in-
centive or ability to monopolize in any event. Nor is it clear how
driving plaintiff out of business would help Shell monopolize the
wholesale or manufacturing markets for gasoline. This case easily
could have been decided for defendant on summary judgment.
35. United States v. Empire Gas Corp. 50 The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's judgment for defendant in a government
charge of attempted monopolization on the ground that plaintiff
had not shown that defendant had a dangerous probability of suc-
cess in that attempt. This case could have been decided summarily
on the basis of lack of dangerous probability of success and absence
of factors that would enable defendant to maintain monopoly
prices, even if some of its competitors had been driven from the
relevant market.
36. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.5' The court of appeals reversed
judgment for plaintiff in the district court. This case is similar to
the IBM cases decided in the Ninth Circuit. See paragraphs 13, 27,
and 30 of this Appendix for similar cases.
37. Kirk-Mayer, Inc. v. Pac Ord, Inc. 52 The district court
granted summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff claimed that
defendant had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by making the
low bid on an exclusive, fixed price government contract for a fixed
term. Defendant obtained the contract at issue for a term of three
years, after which it was again submitted to bids. The court held
that defendant could never reap any benefits from its alleged pre-
dation and, accordingly, it would be highly doubtful if defendant's
pricing was predatory even if it was below its average variable or
marginal cost. This case provides an interesting analogy to other
cases in which entry is sufficiently easy that the alleged predator has
little or no chance to "reap predation's benefits." 53
38. *Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 54 The district court de-
nied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because it had not
established that defendant had engaged in predatory pricing in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act and because there was an issue of fact on
a price discrimination issue. Plaintiff claimed that Frito-Lay had at-
tempted to monopolize the distribution of potato chips in Chicago.
50 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
51 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), revg 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), cerl. dis-
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
52 626 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
53 Id. at 1172.
54 614 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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After a lengthy discussion of the price/cost controversy, the court
concluded that Frito-Lay's prices were above variable cost but per-
haps not above long run incremental cost. It did not focus on the
dangerous probability question even though plaintiff had improved
its market position slightly during the period of defendant's alleged
predation and even though Frito-Lay had only about 25% of the
market. Plaintiff argued that shortages of shelf space would make
entry difficult if defendant obtained a monopoly. Such "shortages"
reflect the competitive nature of the market. Presumably retailers
would be willing to make shelf space available to a rival if one sup-
plier began to raise prices after obtaining a "monopoly." The
opinion gave no information about market shares or the number of
suppliers other than plaintiff and defendant. The court was correct
in denying summary judgment for plaintiff; the facts suggest that
such judgment should have been granted for defendant.
39. *International Distributing Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co.55
This case wins the Golden Fleece Award for predatory pricing
cases. The district court refused to grant defendant's motion for
judgment n.o.v. after the jury gave a verdict for some $13,000,000
on plaintiff's claim that defendant had attempted to monopolize
the market for transporting garments on hangers in less than truck-
load quantities along the traffic lanes running from New York City
to Pennsylvania. The district court denied defendant's motion be-
cause it believed that the evidence supported jury findings that de-
fendant had a dangerous probability of success, that it had charged
predatorily low prices, and that there were high barriers to entry in
this market.
What were these barriers to entry? Defendant, had, after all,
successfully entered the market. Presumably other haulers could
divert trucks to Pennsylvania from other destinations and, if need
be, trucks hauling garments on hangers in truckload lots could take
some garments out, thereby penetrating the market for less than
truck load lots when defendant raised its prices to recoup its preda-
tory losses. Trucks could also be leased and cheaply adapted to
hauling garments on hangers. The district court was wrong in re-
fusing to grant the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. It
should have dismissed the complaint or granted summary judg-
ment for defendant.
40. *Gemini Supply Corp. v. Zeitlin.56 The court denied plain-
tiff's request for an injunction against, among other things, price
discrimination because the sanitary supply business was "highly
competitive, has relatively low barriers to entry and... [defendant]
55 618 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
56 590 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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is only one of many companies competing in that market." 57 The
competitive nature of the sanitary supply business would justify
summary disposition of this case.
41. *Raul International Corp. v. Sealed Power Corp. 58 The district
court refused to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment
on plaintiff's claim that defendant had attempted to monopolize
the market for manufacturing valve tappets. Defendant made 9.2 %
of all tappets made in the United States and 5.3% of those made in
the world. The court denied the motion because it believed a genu-
ine issue of fact existed on plaintiff's claim that defendant's share of
the "aftermarket" or replacement tappet market was greater than
its share of the market for all tappets. It is hard to see what would
prevent manufacturers of tappets for the original equipment mar-
ket from diverting output into the replacement market
("aftermarket") if defendant ever obtained a tappet monopoly
there. Defendant's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted either because of the absence of a dangerous
probability of success or on the basis that defendant lacked the abil-
ity to raise prices in the "aftermarket" to recoup its predatory
losses.
42. *Double H. Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Products Co. 59 The court of
appeals affirmed judgment for defendant on a section 2 Robinson-
Patman Act claim. The district court found that plaintiff had failed
to show that defendant's admitted price discrimination had injured
competition. Plaintiff also claimed that defendant had violated sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act by selling plastic and paper business
machine cores (small spools that carry the paper used in adding
machines, etc.) at predatory prices. Unpersuaded that defendant
had sold cores at prices below average variable cost, the district
court dismissed the Sherman Act claims and plaintiff did not appeal
that portion of the judgment. Plaintiff had made extensive efforts
to show pricing below average variable cost and the district court
engaged in an extended discussion of the price/cost issue. Only at
the very end of its discussion of the Sherman Act claims did the
court note that plaintiff had 60% of the relevant market while de-
fendant had approximately 30%. That fact alone would have justi-
fied summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's attempted
monopolization claim.
43. Joseph Cicconne & Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Industries Inc. 60 The
district court granted judgment for defendant on plaintiff's claim
that defendant had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquir-
57 Id. at 154.
58 586 F. Supp. 349 (D.NJ. 1984).
59 575 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
60 559 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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ing certain companies in the blacktop, aggregate, and road paving
businesses. The court also dismissed plaintiff's claims that defend-
ant had attempted to monopolize such business because plaintiff
had not shown specific intent to monopolize or a dangerous
probability of success. This case turned largely on geographic mar-
ket issues. Once that issue had been resolved, defendant's market
share was so small and the number of competitors was so large that
plaintiff's claim could have been summarily denied.
44. Sales and Advertising Promotion, Inc. v. Donrey, Inc.61 The
district court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant had at-
tempted to monopolize and monopolized a market consisting
largely of newspaper display advertising in Okmulgee County,
southwest Tulsa county, and part of eastern Creek County,
Oklahoma. The court found that plaintiff had failed to provide a
basis to determine defendant's market share and failed to show that
defendant had any dangerous probability of success in attempting
to monopolize such market or monopoly power in the relevant mar-
ket.62 Plaintiff's failure to show a relevant market or defendant's
market share suggests that this case might have been decided for
defendant on summary judgment.
45. *Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co. 63 This was a
complicated patent litigation in which the court disposed of allega-
tions of predatory pricing on plaintiff's part by noting that no evi-
dence had been introduced to show that prices were below average
total cost. Failure to produce evidence of prices below average to-
tal cost would justify summary judgment for defendant under the
traditional predation rules.
46. Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Industries.64 The district
court granted summary judgment for defendant on a monopoliza-
tion claim because Reynolds had only 22% of the market. The
court refused, however, to grant such a motion on an attempted
monopolization claim because there were unresolved issues of fact
on the relationship between defendant's prices and costs. This case
developed when Reynolds decided to replace plaintiff-an in-
dependant tobacco distributor-with its own distribution system.
Just as Airco,65 this case was strictly vertical in nature. Reynolds was
simply trying to replace its previous distributor with its own distri-
bution system. It was not attempting to monopolize anything ex-
cept the distribution of its own products. The district court should
also have granted defendant summary judgment on the attempt
61 598 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Okla. 1984).
62 Id. at 547.
63 557 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
64 513 F. Supp. 726 (D. Hawaii 1981).
65 Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984).
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claim, without regard to the relationship between its prices and
costs.
47. Hoyt Heater Co. v. American Appliance Manufacturing Co.66
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on a Robinson-Patman Act claim, largely on the grounds that
plaintiff had not shown that defendant's prices for hot water heaters
were below average variable cost. There were other grounds for
not finding competitive injury, however, in that it appeared that
plaintiff had a better year at the time the alleged violation occurred
than in any previous year.
48. Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems,
Inc. 67 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's claim that defendant had attempted to mo-
nopolize the car leasing market because of its participation in fly-
drive plans with two different airlines. The court found that de-
fendant had about 20-25% of the car rental market in Hawaii. This
was not sufficient to show a dangerous probability of successful
monopolization.
49. Foremost International Tours, Inc. v. Quantas Airways, Ltd.68
The district court held that plaintiff had not established its claim
that defendant had engaged in predatory conduct to monopolize
the inclusive tour market in the South Pacific. Even though defend-
ant lost money on the land portion of inclusive tours it sold after
integrating into tour sales following a period when plaintiff acted as
its agent for the sale of such tours, prices for the combined air
transport-land portion taken together were above average total
cost. This was basically a vertical dispute between a terminated
agent and its former principal and as such does not involve a mo-
nopolization problem at all. Summary judgment could have been
granted for defendant both because of the vertical nature of the
dispute and because defendant's prices were above average total
cost.
50. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel.69 On a motion to dismiss,
the district court held that defendant's low prices for electric golf
carts could not give rise to an inference of bad intent under section
2 of the Sherman Act because such prices resulted from subsidies
granted by the Polish government. Although the court declined to
dismiss the complaint entirely because it raised other issues not re-
lated to predatory pricing, the court effectively eliminated all preda-
tory pricing issues from the case in its decision of the motion to
dismiss.
66 502 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
67 491 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Hawaii 1980).
68 478 F. Supp. 589 (D. Hawaii 1979).
69 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
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51. Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Institute.70 The district court
held that plaintiff had not shown that defendant had any dangerous
probability of succeeding in an alleged attempt to monopolize the
market for services from scanning electron microscopes within a
150 mile radius of Philadelphia. Summary judgment could have
been granted for defendant because plaintiff had failed to establish
a relevant market and, even assuming a narrow definition of such
market, defendant "does not even approach a share of this market
which would justify a finding of monopoly or even a dangerous
probability of success in an attempt case." 71
52. Weber v. Wynne.72 The district court granted judgment for
defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant had attempted to mo-
nopolize the newspaper clipping service market because the "barri-
ers to entry into the relevant market are so low as to be almost non-
existent."73 The court also held that there was no dangerous
probability that defendant could successfully monopolize the rele-
vant market. The absence of barriers to entry that the court noted
would justify summary judgment for defendant.
53. Flair Zipper Corp. v. Textron, Inc. 7 4 The district court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of
plaintiff's case to the court and jury. Plaintiff claimed that defend-
ant's low prices for No. 2 nylon zippers involved an attempt to mo-
nopolize the market for that product in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The court found that defendant's cuts had been
made in response to reductions it believed plaintiff had already
made. In any event, plaintiff had not shown what the market shares
were and, therefore, had failed to lay a foundation for showing that
defendant had a dangerous probability of successfully monopoliz-
ing the relevant market. For these reasons summary judgment for
defendant would also have been appropriate.
54. Lormar, Inc. v. Kroger Co. 75 The district court found that
defendant's price cuts in the Blanchester, Ohio, Kroger store were
in response to cuts already made by its competitor, plaintiff, and,
therefore, denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining or-
der to prevent defendant from selling at unreasonably low or below
cost prices.
55. Inter City Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Co. 76 Plaintiff's attempt to
enjoin defendant from charging allegedly predatorily low prices
70 450 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
71 Id. at 1285.
72 431 F. Supp. 1048 (D.NJ. 1977).
73 Id. at 1055 n.9.
74 1980-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) 63,555 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
75 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,498 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
76 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 60,948 (D. Minn. 1976).
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failed because defendant apparently had only from 23% to 29% of
the market for No. 2 heating oil. This was insufficient to show a
dangerous probability of successful monopolization. Barriers to
entry were also low.
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Appendix B
Summary of Predatory Pricing Cases
A.' B. C.2 D.
Case (1) Was Case Decided Could It Have Been Basis For
For D on Motion Decided for D on Answer to C (2)
Motion Under
Matsushita?
1 Y (SJ) Y 3,4
2 N Y 2,3,4
3 N Y 4
4 N Y 3,4
5 Y (NOV) Y 2,3,4
6 Y (NOV) Y 2,3,4
7 N Y 1
8 N Y 1
9 Y (SJ) Y 1
10 N Y 1
11 N Y 3,4
12 N Y 1
13 N Y 1,4
14 Y (SJ) Y 2,3,4
15 Y (SJ) Y 3,4
16 N N
17 Y (DV) Y 3,4
18 N Y 5
19 N Y 3,4
20 N Y 1
21 N Y 7
22 N Y 3
23 N Y 2,3,4
24 N Y 4
25 Y (NOV) Y 1,5
26 N Y (?) 6
27 Y (DV) Y 1,4
28 N Y 2,4
29 Y (DV) Y 4
30 Y (DV) Y 1,4
31 N Y 3
32 Y (DV) Y 2,3,4
1 The numbers in Column A of Appendix B refer to the cases set forth in Appendix A.
2 The key to the numbers in Column D of Appendix B is set forth below:
1. The alleged predator's price exceeded its own average total cost.
2. The court defined the market in an unrealistically narrow way.
3. The alleged predator did not have a dangerous probability of successfully
monopolizing a realistically defined market.
4. The alleged predator would not have been able to raise and maintain
monopoly prices long enough to recoup the losses suffered during the
predatory period.
5. Plaintiff did not prove that it was injured by defendant's conduct.
6. Plaintiff failed to allege or prove a relevant market.
7. Summary judgment could be granted for defendant if the law defined
predatory prices as those below the alleged predator's short run marginal
or average variable cost.
8. Defendant's low prices were supported by foreign government subsidy.
9. Defendant's price cuts were in response to plaintiff's price cuts.
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33 N Y 7
34 Y (DV) Y 2,3,4
35 N Y 4
36 N Y 1,4
37 Y (SJ) Y 4
38 N Y 3,4
39 N Y 2,3,4
40 N Y 3,4
41 N Y 2,3,4
42 N Y 3,4
43 N Y 3,4
44 N Y 6
45 N Y 1
46 N Y 2,3,4
47 Y (SJ) Y 5, 7
48 Y (SJ) Y 3
49 N Y 1, 2
50 Y (MTD) Y 8
51 N Y 3
52 N Y 4
53 Y (DV) Y 6,9
54 Y (TRO) Y 9
55 Y (INJUNCTION) Y 3,4
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Appendix C
Predatory Pricing Articles Since 1975
1. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976).
2. Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 891 (1976).
3. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV.
901 (1976).
4. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE LJ. 284 (1977).
5. Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J.
1337 (1978).
6. Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88 YALE Lj. 1183
(1979).
7. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Preven-
tion of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE LJ. 1 (1979).
8. Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
9. Koller, When is Pricing Predatory?, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 283
(1979).
10. Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994 (1979).
11. Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory
Practices, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 233 (1979).
12. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23J. L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
13. Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981).
14. Lefever, Predatory Pricing Rules: A Comment on Williamson's Out-
put Restriction Rule, 90 YALE L.J. 1639 (1981).
15. Williamson, Reply to Lefever, 90 YALE L.J. 1646 (1981).
16. Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing
and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
17. Note, The Retreat from the AVC Rule and the Search for a Practical
Alternative, 22 B.C.L. REV. 467 (1981).
18. Sherrer, Predatory Pricing: An Evaluation of its Potential for Abuse
Under Government Procurement Contracts, 6 J. CORP. L. 531 (1981).
19. Monroe & Hill, The Predatory Pricing Controversy: Academic Theo-
ries Enter the Courtroom, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 539 (1982).
20. Morse, The Measure of Damages in a Lawsuit Involving Allegations
of Price Discrimination or Predatory Pricing: Proving Antitrust Damages, 48
BROOKLYN L. REV. 479 (1982).
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21. Areeda, Predatory Pricing, 49 ANTITRUST LJ. 897 (1980).
22. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263 (1981).
23. Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982).
24. Zerbe & Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alter-
native Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982).
25. Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 443 (1983).
